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What is the ultimate nature of reality? This paper 
defends an answer in terms of informational realism 
(IR). It does so in three stages. First, it is shown that, 
within the debate about structural realism (SR), 
epistemic (ESR) and ontic (OSR) structural realism are 
reconcilable by using the methodology of the levels of 
abstractions. It follows that OSR is defensible from a 
structuralist-friendly position. Second, it is argued that 
OSR is also plausible, because not all related objects 
are logically prior to all relational structures. The 
relation of difference is at least as fundamental as 
(because constitutive of) any relata. Third, it is 
suggested that an ontology of structural objects for 
OSR can reasonably be developed in terms of 
informational objects, and that Object Oriented 
Programming provides a flexible and powerful 
methodology with which to clarify and make precise 
the concept of “informational object”. The outcome is 
informational realism, the view that the world is the 
totality of informational objects dynamically 
interacting with each other. 
Keywords: Structural realism, epistemic structural 
realism, ontic structural realism, levels of abstraction, 
informational ontology, object oriented programming. 
1 Introduction: checkmate in three moves  
This paper defends a metaphysical position – 
informational realism (IR) – as a solution to a 
problem. The problem is deceptively elementary: what 
is the ultimate nature of reality? The answer is 
misleadingly simple: it is informational. The 
cumulative steps from the problem to the solution are 
the difficult part of the process. To explain them, the 
analogy of a chess problem comes handy: white 
checkmates in three moves.  
Here is the outline of the strategy. On the board we 
find the debate about structural realism (SR; Maxwell 
[1970]; Worrall [1989]; Ladyman [1998]). This is the 
view that knowledge of the world is knowledge of its 
structural properties. Epistemic structural realism 
(ESR; Morganti [forthcoming]) holds that objects are 
what remain in principle unknowable once the 
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knowable structures of reality have been factored out. 
Ontic structural realism (OSR; Votsis [forthcoming]) 
holds that objects are themselves structures.  
The first move shows that ESR and OSR are 
reconcilable, and hence that OSR is defensible from a 
structuralist-friendly perspective.  
The second move shows that OSR is also plausible 
because not all related objects are logically prior to all 
relational structures: no relata are logically prior to the 
relation of difference.  
The third move shows that an ontology of structural 
objects (Chakravartty [2002]) can reasonably be 
developed in terms of informational objects, and that 
Object Oriented Programming (OOP) provides a 
flexible and powerful methodology with which to 
clarify and make precise the concept of “informational 
object”.  
The outcome of the three moves is informational 
realism, the view that the world is the totality of 
informational objects dynamically interacting with 
each other. Checkmate. 
2 The pieces on the board: structural 
realism and its ontological challenge 
Broadly constructed, Structural Realism argues that:  
SR) instrumentally and predictively successful models 
(especially, but not only, those propounded by 
scientific theories) can be, in the best circumstances, 
increasingly informative about the relations that obtain 
between the (possibly unobservable) objects that 
constitute the system under investigation (through the 
observable phenomena).  
SR leaves unspecified the nature of the relata in the 
structures. This problem has resuscitated the classic 
question about the knowability of the ontological status 
of objects. Consider the following formalism. The 
scheme of a structure S comprises four sets: 
1) a non-empty set O of objects (the domain of S), 
2) a non-empty set P of first-order, one-place 
properties of the objects in O,  
3) a non-empty set of relations R on O, and 
4) a potentially empty set T of transitions rules 
(operations) on O. 
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Table 1: the SLMS scheme 
 
What are the objects in O? According to Epistemic 
Structural Realism, objects can only be posited as ontic 
residua, what remains in principle unknowable once the 
knowable structures of reality have been factored out: 
ESR) models can be increasingly informative only about 
the relations that obtain between the objects, but not 
about the first-order, one-place predicates (the intrinsic 
nature) qualifying the objects in themselves. 
According to Ontic Structural Realism, however, the 
closing clause needs not to be granted:  
OSR) ultimately, objects are themselves structures and in 
the best cases they can be indirectly captured in our 
models, at least in principle. 
3 First move: ESR and OSR are not 
incompatible  
The first move is to try to combine the virtues of both 
brands of SR without incurring their costs.  
3.1 Indirect knowledge 
Structural realism seeks to combine some ontological 
commitment with a degree of epistemic resilience to 
theory change. It achieves this flexibility by decoupling 
not knowledge from reality, like instrumentalism does, 
but, within knowledge itself, the descriptions of the 
knowable structural characteristics of the system from the 
explanations of its intrinsic properties. Both can still 
crash, but the structural descriptions are far more resilient 
to change than the ontological explanations.  
All this comes at a price. SR gains epistemic resilience 
only by endorsing a view of knowledge as an indirect 
relation between the epistemic (possibly multi-) agent and 
the system under analysis, and at the expense of a 
somewhat weakened ontological commitment. This can 
be achieved by relying on the method of levels of 
abstraction (LoAs) (Floridi and Sanders [2004]), in the 
following way. 
3.2 Levels of abstraction 
The method of LoA comes from modelling in science and 
is influenced by an area of Computer Science, called 
Formal Methods, in which discrete mathematics is used 
to specify and analyse the behaviour of information 
systems.  
A LoA consists of a collection of observables. An 
observable is an interpreted typed variable, that is, a 
variable with a well-defined possible set of values 
together with a statement of the properties of the system 
under consideration for which it stands. The target of a 
LoA is called the system. A system may be accessed and 
described at a range of LoAs and so can have a range of 
models.  
An explicit reference to the LoA clarifies that  
i) the model of a system is a function of the available 
observables; 
ii) different LoA may be fairly ranked depending on how 
well they satisfy modelling specifications (e.g. 
informativeness, coherence, elegance, explanatory power, 
consistency with the data, predictive power, etc.); and  
iii) different analyses can be fairly compared provided 
that they share the same LoA.  
The method of LoA is also an efficient way of making 
explicit and managing the ontological commitment of a 
theory. Let us see how. 
3.3 Ontological commitments and levels of 
abstractions 
A theory comprises at least a LoA and a model. The LoA 
allows the theory to analyse the system and to elaborate a 
model that identifies a structure of the system at the given 
LoA. So the structuralist position becomes: 
SRLOA) instrumentally and predictively successful models 
(especially, but not only, those propounded by scientific 
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Table 2: the SLMS scheme with ontological commitment 
 
increasingly informative about the relations that obtain 
between the (possibly unobservable) objects that 
constitute the system under investigation (through the 
observable phenomena).  
This is the system-level-model-structure (SLMS) scheme 
(Table 1). 
The ontological commitment of a theory can now be 
understood by distinguishing between a committing and a 
committed component.  
A theory commits itself ontologically by adopting a (set 
of) LoA. Compare this to the case in which one has 
chosen a car model but has not bought one yet. A theory 
shows its ontological commitment in full through its 
model, which is therefore the bearer of the actual 
commitment. The analogy here is with the specific car 
one has actually bought. So LoAs commit a theory to 
types while models commit it to the corresponding tokens 
(Table 2).  
The distinction just introduced can now be used to 
reconcile ESR and OSR.  
3.4 How to reconcile ESR and OSR 
ESR endorses a minimalist approach. It argues that a 
theory is justified in adopting a LoA that commits it (the 
theory itself) ontologically to a realist interpretation of 
only the structural properties of the system identified by 
the model produced by the theory at the chosen LoA. 
This minimal ontological commitment is primary or first-
order, that is, it concerns first-order knowledge of the 
structural properties of the system under investigation.  
ESR is arguably correct. On the one hand, the adoption of 
any LoA supporting a degree of first-order ontological 
commitment higher than the epistemic-structuralist one is 
metaphysically risky and suspicious. It is certainly 
unnecessary and not backed up by a general conception 
of knowledge as an indirect relation with the world. In 
short, Ockham’s razor applies. Now, the current debate 
on SR has been developing on the assumption that OSR 
and ESR are incompatible, one of the two must go, and it 
is not ESR.  
This argument against OSR is misguided because ESR 
and OSR work at separate LoA. As far as a first-order 
analysis is concerned, SR justifies only one kind of 
ontological commitment, the one endorsed by ESR. 
However, at a derivative or second-order level of 
analysis, OSR correctly argues in favour of an 
economical view of objects.  
Consider again the SLMS scheme. The assumption is that 
there is no direct (i.e. LoA-free) knowledge of the 
intrinsic nature of the objects constituting the system 
under investigation. However, once a theory has 
ontologically committed itself to the structural properties 
of the system, one is entitled to infer indirectly that, 
whatever the system and its components (i.e., the objects 
or relata) are in themselves, they must be such as to allow 
the theory to capture their structural/relational properties. 
But what are the conditions of possibility of knowledge 
(the knowledge offered by the theory) of the structural 
properties of the system? The question is whether there 
might be a justifiable LoA that commits the theory to 
some kind of description of the type of relata that support 
the structural properties of the system identified by the 
model produced by the theory. ESR simply has nothing to 
offer here, for its concern is with a first-order 
commitment. OSR, on the contrary, can argue in favour 
of a minimalist approach. And this is a very reasonable 
step to take. The LoA justifiably adoptable at this second 
level is one according to which the relata are themselves 
understood in structural terms.  
To summarise, at the first-order level (see Table 3), we 
adopt a transcendental approach to knowledge – as a 
LoA-mediated relation with reality – and use Ockham’s 
razor as a methodologically safety measure to limit the 
number of (types of) components to which a theory 
should be ontologically committed. In the best 
circumstances, LoAs should ontologically commit a 
theory at most to the existence in the world of the (type 
of) structures identified by its models. At a second-order 
level, we re-adopt a transcendental approach to what 
makes possible the previous first-order knowledge of 
structures, and apply a qualitatively modified version of 
Ockham’s razor, which now suggests to keep the nature 
of objects as simple as possible: entia non sunt 
complicanda praeter necessitatem, as it were. According 
to this new safety principle, it is reasonable to assume 











Table 3: the SLMS scheme with ordered ontological commitments 
 
needs to justify its first-order commitment. Since the two 
ontological commitments occur at different levels there is 
no incompatibility and hence no objection. End of the 
first move. 
4 Second move: relata are not logical prior to 
all relations 
Unfortunately, eliminating the apparent inconsistency 
between ESR and OSR does not yet show that OSR is 
plausible. A direct and quite substantial objection against 
OSR still needs to be neutralized. This is our second 
move. Relations (structures) require relata (structured 
objects), which therefore cannot be further identified as 
relations without running into some vicious circularity or 
infinite regress. Yet this is precisely what OSR needs to 
argue, if the very idea of structural objects is supposed to 
make sense. 
Certainly external relations usually require relata. 
Distance is a good example. Yet internal relations 
constitute their relata for what they are. “Married” comes 
easily to one’s mind: Mary and John are married only 
because of their mutual relation.  
Unfortunately, internal relations seem to supervene on 
their relata and further qualify them. Mary and John did 
not come into existence by getting married; they only 
acquired a new contingent property, their marital status, 
after their wedding. If one wants to defend the logical 
priority of internal relations over their relata, then one has 
to show much more, namely that the essential properties 
of the objects in question depend upon some fundamental 
internal properties. This is difficult but not impossible. 
For there is a significant case, metaphysically more 
fundamental than the case in which the essence of the 
relata is in question. This is the (internal) relation of 
difference, which constitutes its relata as a precondition 
for their existence. Relata as merely differentiated entities 
and nothing else (at least not yet) are possible only 
because there is a relation of difference in the first place. 
For consider what a completely undifferentiated object x 
might be. It would be one unobservable at any possible 
LoA. This means that there would be no possible world in 
which x would exist. And this is equivalent to saying that 
x would not exist. Call this the modified Leibnizian law 
of the necessary inexistence of the undifferentiable in 
principle. The law still says very little about the nature of 
the entities/relata in question, but there is finally a clear 
sense in which relata are not necessarily prior to a more 
fundamental internal relation of difference. Difference is 
our Ur-relation, as it were. In Eddington’s words: “The 
relations unite the relata; the relata are the meeting 
points of the relations. The one is unthinkable apart from 
the other. I do not think that a more general starting-point 
of structure could be conceived” (Eddington [1928], 230–
231, quoted in French [2003], 233). This leads us to the 
last move. 
5 Third move: the concept of a structural 
object is empty 
Even if ESR and OSR are compatible, and even if it is not 
true that, ultimately, structured relata are necessarily 
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clear grasp of what these structural objects might be like, 
even if indirectly or metatheoretically.  
A straightforward way of making sense of these structural 
objects is as informational objects, that is as clusters of 
data, not in the alphanumeric sense of the word, but in an 
equally common sense of differences de re, i.e. mind-
independent points of lack of uniformity.  
In its simplest form, a datum can be reduced to just a lack 
of uniformity, that is, a binary difference, like the 
presence and the absence of a black dot, or a change of 
state, from there being no black dot at all to there being 
one. Admittedly, a datum is usually classified as the 
relatum exhibiting the anomaly, often because this is 
perceptually more conspicuous or subjectively less 
redundant than the other relatum, seen as a background 
condition. However, the relation of difference is binary 
and symmetric. A white sheet of paper is a constitutive 
part of the datum itself, together with the fundamental 
relation of difference that couples it with the dot. In this 
specific sense, nothing is a datum per se, without its 
counterpart, exactly like nobody can be a wife without 
there being a husband. So, ontologically, data, as still 
unqualified differences, are purely relational entities. Of 
course, from a structural perspective, they remain 
unknowable in themselves. One never deals with pure 
data but only with somewhat interpreted data. Now 
clusters of data as relational entities are the relata we are 
looking for in our modified version of OSR. 
As French [2001] points out, in the context of the 
philosophy of physics, “if we want to continue to talk, in 
everyday language, about electrons as objects - because 
we lack the logico-linguistic resources to do otherwise - 
then we can do so ‘only indirectly’, ‘... not insofar as they 
themselves, as individuals, are given, but so far as they 
are describable as “points of intersection” of certain 
relations’ (Cassirer, ibid.)”.  
So what an informational ontology could look like? 
Object Oriented Programming (OOP) provides an 
excellent example of a flexible and powerful 
methodology with which to clarify and make precise the 
concept of “informational object”.  
OOP is a method of programming that radically changed 
the approach to software development. Historically, a 
program was viewed as an algorithmic procedure that 
takes input data, processes it, and produces output data. 
The difficulty was then represented by the elaboration of 
the algorithmic process. OOP has shifted the focus from 
the logic procedures, required to manipulate the objects, 
to the objects that need to be manipulated. Consider a 
pawn in a chess game. Its identity is not determined by its 
contingent properties as a physical body, including its 
shape and colour. Rather, a pawn is a cluster of states 
(properties like white or black, and its strategic position 
on the board) and behavioural rules (e.g., it can move 
forward only), which in turn are possible only in relation 
to other pieces and the logical space of the board. For a 
good player, the pawn is only a placeholder standing for 
an “informational object”. It is not a material thing but a 
set of typed variables, using the LoA terminology, a 
mental entity, to put it in Berkeley’s terms, or an entity 
constituted by a bundle of properties, to use a Humean 
expression, whose existence and nature is determined by 
the differences and nomological relations that 
characterise the game of chess. Now in OOP, data 
structures (e.g. the pawn’s property of being white) and 
their behaviour (programming code, e.g. the pawn’s 
power to capture pieces only by moving diagonally 
forward) are packaged together as (informational) 
objects. Objects are then grouped in a hierarchy of classes 
(e.g. pawns), with each class inheriting characteristics 
from the class above it (e.g. all pieces but the king can be 
captured, so every pawn can be captured). A class is a 
named representation for an abstraction, where an 
abstraction is a named collection of attributes and 
behaviour relevant to modelling a given entity for some 
particular purpose at a certain LoA. The routines or logic 
sequences that can manipulate the objects are called 
methods. A method is a particular implementation of an 
operation, i.e. an action or transformation that an object 
performs or is subject to by a certain class. Objects 
communicate with each other through well-defined 
interfaces called messages.  
Clearly OOP provides us with a concept of informational 
objects that is richer than our minimalist approach to 
informational realism may allow us. Recall that all we are 
placing in the world are informational objects as the 
conditions of possibility of those structures that our first-
order LoAs allow us to attribute to the world in the first 
place. OOP is not a viable way of doing philosophical 
ontology, but a valuable methodology to clarify the 
nature of our ontological components.  
Time has come to summarise the proposed solution to the 
ontological problem. 
6 Informational realism 
Informational realism (IR) is a version of SR. As a form 
of realism, it is committed to the existence of a mind-
independent reality. Like ESR, it supports a first-order, 
minimal ontological commitment in favour of the 
structural properties of reality. Like OSR, it also supports 
a second-order, minimal ontological commitment in 
favour of objects understood informationally. This 
second-order commitment is justified by epistemic 
reasons. We are allowed to commit ourselves 
ontologically to whatever minimal conception of objects 
is useful to make sense of our first-order commitment. IR 
argues that, as far as we can tell, the ultimate nature of 
reality is informational, that is, it makes sense to adopt a 
LoA at which our mind-independent reality is constituted 
by relata that are neither substantial nor material (they 
might well be, but we have no reasons to suppose them to 
be so) but informational. We are ready for a definition: 
IR) instrumentally and predictively successful models 
(especially, but not only, those propounded by scientific 
theories) at a given LoA can be, in the best 
circumstances, increasingly informative about the 
relations that obtain between the (possibly unobservable) 
informational objects that constitute the system under 
investigation (through the observable phenomena).  
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7 Conclusion 
Philosophers often rely on spatial analogies to explain 
their theories. References to rooms are particularly 
popular. Sextus Empiricus thought that we are like men 
searching for gold, or shooting at a target in a dark room: 
no matter how long the search or the shooting proceeds, it 
is pointless because in principle there is no way to 
establish whether any of us has found a nugget or hit the 
mark. Turing used different rooms for his test. And Searle 
devised a Chinese room for his couterexample. I shall 
rely on their examples and suggest a double box analogy 
to illustrate IR. But first, a final bit of terminology. 
In software engineering, black-box refers to a test-design 
method that focuses on testing functional or behavioral 
requirements of a program. The methodology treats the 
analyisandum as a nontransparent and closed system, 
avoiding using explicit knowledge of its internal nature or 
structure to understand the way it works. The opposite 
methodology is known as white- or glass-box test design. 
This allows one to “look inside” the system, and it 
focuses on using specific and detailed knowledge of the 
program code to guide the selection of test data. A grey-
box approach is one that allows only a partial view of the 
internal properties of the system. 
According to IR, any white-box approach to reality is 
excluded in principle, given the indirect nature of 
knowledge. We look at the world as if we were in Sextus’ 
dark room. This is the first box. We are in it, but our 
target is not representationalist, nor are our interactions 
with the furniture in the room unidirectional, as Sextus 
assumed. And contrary to Sextus’ it is a grey-box. In the 
best cases, it allows the reconstruction of the structural 
properties relating the furniture of the room, i.e. our 
informational objects. The latter are our second type of 
boxes. Like in Turing’s test, they are black-boxes, not 
directly knowable, but “epistemically interactable”. 
Sometimes we can indirectly capture their nature by 
observing their behaviour and mutual interactions, but we 
do not know their intrinsic properties.  
IR takes our epistemic goal to be constructionist, not 
representationalist. Knowledge is not a matter of hitting 
or finding, but of designing and constructing, and one 
may construct successfully even in the dark. Since we 
wish to devise an intelligible conceptual environment, we 
do so not by trying to photocopying whatever is in the 
room (representationalist epistemology), but by 
interacting with it as a resource for our semantic tasks, 
interrogating it through experience, tests and experiments. 
Out of metaphor, reality is not a source but a resource for 
knowledge. Structural objects (clusters of data as 
relational entities) work like constraining affordances, 
exploitable by a theory, at a given LoA, as input of 
adequate queries to produce information (the model) as 
output. In this respect, we are more like Turing’s 
interrogator, since the model of investigation is erotetic: 
we query the world as a database. But since our task is 
not to find out who is who, we resemble Searle in his 
Chinese room: we get the data on one side and produce 
information on the other. The difference, in this case, is 
that we understand the semantic rules of the game. 
Black-boxes in a grey-box, this is the basic idea behind 
IR. The last specification is that the qualifications are 
level-dependent, as the distinction between system and 
component or unit of the system is. A black-box may be 
opened, but opening it transforms it into a grey-box, in 
which more black-boxes may be found. Whether ad 
infinitum we simply cannot know.  
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